

SECRET

18 February 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Executive Director, NPIC

SUBJECT : North Korean Ground Forces

1. The Imagery Exploitation Group's photographic study of selected North Korean ground force installations now seem to be drawing to a close. Nearly all areas cited in the requirement apparently have been scanned and their military facilities described in detail. OSR's North Korea analysts would like to meet soon with the IEG officers involved to resolve a small residue of interpretation questions and to tidy up other loose ends.

2. OSR wishes to underline the importance of this work and express appreciation for IEG's competent handling. The product is a unique contribution to intelligence on North Korean ground forces and hence to the problem of determining the true threat to South Korea. Analysis of the material has provided the first good understanding of North Korean combat units up to divisional size. OSR is drawing on these data for one intelligence memorandum now in draft, and hopes to base on them another, more definitive work to be published in 4 or 5 months.

3. IEG could very usefully supplement its present contribution if it could continue limited third-phase readout of North Korean ground force targets. Analysis of the installations studied so far indicates they include units subordinate to three of the four divisions included in the 5th Army Group. By completing the readout of these four divisions and the army group units themselves, IEG would provide data for analyzing a complete army group, the basic, integrated combat unit of the North Korean Army. Knowledge of army group makeup is vital for an understanding of North Korean military doctrine, which evidence indicates has recently changed, and about which a memorandum is scheduled for publication late this year.

DECLASS REVIEW by NIMA/DOD

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4. Readout of from 50 to 70 installations probably would be required to complete the study of the 5th Army Group. The task would thus be about the same size as that previously undertaken by IEG. The effort probably could be reduced 25 to 30 percent, however, by confining the readout to the latest and best photography, foregoing a chronological study. The work already accomplished by IEG should make such a study unnecessary. A completion date of September 1970 would make the results available for analysis and publication in the memorandum scheduled for the last quarter of 1970. Interim results would support the memorandum due in June 1970.

5. Let's get your pros and mine together to work this out.




Director  
Strategic Research

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# North Korea

- 1 man yr
- 15 hrs per report
- ? - separate memos  
+ BIIRs
- AAA additional



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5 PIs in the Br.  
SR-71 & KH missions

IAS - ?  
DIA - ?

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] *AEM*

[REDACTED] called. Statistics he gave to you this morning were not accurate. He got out the reports and in the 1969 Program DIA produced 24 reports. Most of them came out after the end of the accounting period (went over into 1970). They are slated to do 27 reports in the Fourth Quarter. So far they are early and he has received 18 reports.

*hold with  
North Korean  
papers.*

[REDACTED]  
6 March 1970  
(DATE)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

*D/OSR*

*Bruce - you & I need to  
talk about this.*

*- One specific question: are  
the 50-70 additional 5th Army  
Group installations (mentioned in  
your memo to me) the same ones  
you have asked IAS and now  
DIA to do?*

*9 Mar 70*  
(DATE)

FORM NO.  
1 AUG 54

101

REPLACES FORM 10-101  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

**SECRET**

NPIC/D-75-70

9 MAR 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research

SUBJECT : North Korean Ground Forces

1. Thanks for your nice words concerning our support of the North Korean ground force studies. We are eager to clean up any loose ends as quickly as possible. I'd suggest you ask [ ] -- I assume he is still your man on the project -- to call [ ] on [ ] and arrange an early meeting. Don could go out there, but I feel they would have much greater success in resolving questions here where film, light table and scopes are readily available.

2. Concerning the additional work on other units of the 5th Army Group, I should prefer that we first clean up the above-mentioned loose ends before starting any new work. We shall be using the same interpreters for both the clean-up and the new work. As usual, they must interrupt such work whenever incoming film from a mission requires first and second phase exploitation.

3. Once the clean-up work is completed I believe we both shall have a better idea of how to proceed with the analysis of the other units. Let's touch base again when [ ] are well along toward completing the clean-up operation.

[ ]

Executive Director  
National Photographic Interpretation Center

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressee  
2 - NPIC/ODIR

NPIC/ODIR: [ ] (6 March 1970)